Demography and the Economy by Alan J. Auerbach
 
Comments on Axel Börsch-Supan and Alexander Ludwig, “Old Europe ages: Reform and 
Reform Backlashes” by Alan J. Auerbach, University of California, Berkeley, July 2008 
 
 
Alan J. Auerbach is the Robert D. Burch Professor of Economics and Law and 
director of the Robert D. Burch Center for Tax Policy and Public Finance at the University of 
California, Berkeley, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
 
This paper is the latest in a series by the authors utilizing a multi-country computable 
general equilibrium model that features international capital flows and a rich characterization of 
demographic variables.  In earlier work, the model has been used to consider the macroeconomic 
effects of aging and the role of pension reform in improving welfare and macroeconomic 
performance.  The present effort focuses on a related question: whether a Europe that is “old” 
both in history and in population can prosper even as the strong demographic transition already 
underway continues.  The answer is a provisional “yes” and Figure 15 shows the keys to success.  
The authors suggest that the following measures, in some combination, could keep per capita 
consumption rising even as these countries’ populations age: 
 
1. Adopt labor market reforms aimed at increasing labor force participation; 
2. Adopt a funded public pension plan; and 
3. Force people to work 
 
The last prescription, of course, is problematic.  A reduction in hours – among those 
already working – in response to labor market reforms is a natural part of the household 
decision-making process; there is no easy way to prevent it, and a government seeking to 
maximize welfare, rather than simply output, would not want to.  But even the other  
prescriptions are not so simple.  How to adopt labor market reforms that have proved so difficult 
in the past is certainly a challenge, and the benefits of a funded pension plan can not be 
magically obtained without a painful transition to funding that has left most countries seeking 
other options.  Let me expand a little on these points. 
 
How can labor market reforms be adopted? 
The authors characterize a suite of labor market changes that might be accomplished by 
Old Europe, including increases in labor market participation by the elderly, the young, and 
women, along with a reduction in the unemployment rate.  The fact that an existing advanced 
European country – Denmark – already has these characteristics is a good start in thinking about 
what might be possible elsewhere.  But it is only a start.  The paper does not specify what actual 
policy reforms might accomplish these changes in the labor market, nor does it provide evidence 
that all of these reforms would be welfare-improving, even if they were feasible.  For example, 
Italy’s lower labor force participation rate among women may reflect some difference in social 
or cultural values, i.e., in preferences, and overriding these preferences could be detrimental to 
social welfare.  Without a fuller specification of the nature of the existing constraints on labor 
markets and the costs of relaxing them, it is hard to know whether, and at what social cost, the 
labor market changes considered here could be accomplished. 
 
Achieving pension reform 
The paper shows that the transition to an older society has less severe macroeconomic 
consequences when a funded pension system is in place.  This is a lesson from the authors’ 
earlier simulation studies, and it makes perfect sense.  To continue servicing a pay-as-you-go  
(PAYG) public pension system as the old-age dependency ratio increases, a country must 
increase marginal tax rates on workers, thereby worsening labor market distortions.  Under a 
funded system, of course, this won’t happen, as workers provide for their own future retirement 
through contributions that are linked to future benefits. 
But getting to a funded system is different from starting with one.  The capital 
accumulation needed in transition must come at the expense of some generations, and this 
requirement has posed a very high political obstacle that has left countries in search of 
alternatives.  The recent pension reforms in Sweden and Germany are illustrations of attempts to 
achieve greater financial stability and intergenerational equity without departing from the PAYG 
framework.  It might make sense for the authors to consider a more achievable pension reform 
within the PAYG format as they search for options for Old Europe, for example changes that 
would increase the linkage between an individual’s taxes and benefits and thereby lessen the 
perceived tax burden of pension contributions. 
 
Interpreting the Results 
As already mentioned, the paper uses a multi-country, general equilibrium simulation 
model the authors have developed in prior work.  Because development of the model is not this 
paper’s primary focus, there is relatively little discussion of the various parameter choices made 
in the calibration process.  One does not want to get bogged down reviewing all aspects of the 
model, but it would be useful if Börsch-Supan and Ludwig provided further elaboration as to the 
model’s key parameters.  In particular, on which parameters do the paper’s main result critically 
hinge, and how certain are we about the values chosen?  
In qualitative terms, most of the paper’s findings make sense, although some would 
benefit from further elaboration.  For example, one might have expected that, with a hump-
shaped productivity profile, an increase in elderly workers would lead to a less productive labor 
force, at least relative to the productivity that one would observe if productivity profiles were flat 
with respect to age.  As Figure 17 shows, however, the opposite result occurs.  Presumably, this 
is because of the shape and location of the hump, in particular that productivity does not fall off 
so fast to make the declines in older age offset the increases at slightly lower ages. 
Another example of at least one reader’s difficulty in interpreting the results is in Figure 
10, where, as in other figures in the paper, the authors use what might be characterized as a 
graphical difference-in-differences approach to report the effects of policies.  I think, by the way, 
that this method of analysis is a useful and innovative way of looking separately at the many 
pieces of a complicated whole, but it does not eliminate the complexity of the results, which 
often must be traced to a series of interacting factors.  The first lower panel of Figure 10 shows 
the marginal impact on hours of having a public pension system.  As discussed above, we would 
expect a favorable outcome, but this is actually what we observe only if labor market reforms are 
also implemented; that is, hours of work are higher for a funded pension plan than for the status 




In summary, this is a paper that barrages the reader with many interesting findings.  Some 
are quite intuitive, while others are less so.  Such less intuitive findings can be where the payoff 
lies in using such models, for by understanding where these findings come from we gain a better  
understanding of how different factors interact.  But much of the paper’s findings derive from its 
assumptions, in particular those about what labor market reforms might deliver.  We can see 
quite clearly from the paper’s results that these reforms could matter in a big way for future 
economic performance.  But we don’t know any more than before what has kept these reforms 
from being adopted or how they might be achieved in the future.  Thus, the paper shows that Old 
Europe can prosper.  But whether it will remains a very open question. 